A Case of Compassion: Justice O'Hern's Opinion in
L. T. v. New Jersey Department of Human Services
Caty Winslow"
In 1993, New Jersey's homeless poor and their advocates
cheered the New Jersey Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in L. T
v. New Jersey Department of Human Services.' The opinion, authored by
Justice O'Hern, essentially established that the Department of
Human Services (DHS) had an affirmative obligation to effectively
assist its homeless clients in resolving the problems that led to their
homelessness and in ultimately maintaining housing independent of
DHS assistance. In the opinion,Justice O'Hern stated:
Undoubtedly, DHS wishes that it had more funds in order to
supervise the far-flung operations of the [municipal welfare
departments] that shelter the homeless, as well as more funds to
feed the hungry, care for the children and elderly, and heal the
sick, because all needy people are deserving of the agency's
attention. However, although there are no rankings in the
.catalog of human suffering," . . . surely homelessness represents
something uniquely devastating to the human spirit.
Our clients, the five petitioners in the case, experienced that
devastation firsthand. Four of them were forced to return to that
devastation when DHS stopped their rental assistance because of an
arbitrary time limit, causing their eviction. Justice O'Hern ensured
that such a result would not occur again, stating "we do not read the
legislation as contemplating that at the end of the year [Emergency
Assistance] recipients shall be returned to the streets3 even though
they have made every effort to turn their lives around."
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L. T involved a challenge to the twelve-month cap placed on
rental subsidies provided General Assistance (GA) recipients. 4 The
gravamen of the case was whether New Jersey's General Public
Assistance Law,5 as interpreted by Williams v. New Jersey Department of
Human Services, prohibited an arbitrary time limit on all shelter
assistance. I was one of the attorneys representing the petitioners,
five Paterson GA recipients who were either homeless or facing
eviction because of the twelve-month limit on "temporary rental
assistance."7 DHS argued that providing twelve months of temporary
rental assistance, often after five months of shelter or motel housing,
fully complied with the Williams Court's order that DHS create
programs to make "reasonably certain that the individuals previously8
housed in motels will find shelter and eventually housing elsewhere."
The appellate division agreed with this rationale."
During oral arguments before the New Jersey Supreme Court,
Justice O'Hern asked me whether the Court had not said in Williams
that "despite the best of efforts, some people will indeed slip through
the net."'0 The question was not unexpected. While preparing for
oral argument, our legal team had discussed at length that statement
in Williams," an opinion thatJustice O'Hern authored. 2 I responded

that the petitioners had not slipped through the net; they, in fact,
were being pushed through it."
Two months later, our legal staff learned from Justice O'Hern's
opinion that the Court refused to permit DHS to abandon the
homeless. 4 Justice O'Hern, writing for the Court, found that the
4 See id. at 306, 633 A.2d
at 965.
SN.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:8-107 to

-145 (1997) (presently referred to as Work First
NewJersey General Public Assistance Act); L.7, 134 N.J. at 310, 633 A.2d at 967.
116 N.J. 102, 561 A.2d 244 (1989); see also L.T., 134 N.J. at 312, 633 A.2d at
968.
7 See id. at 308, 633 A.2d at
966.
IId.at 314-15, 311, 321, 633 A.2d at 968, 970.
See id. at 311, 633 A.2d at 968 (citing L.T.v.New Jersey Dep't of Human Serv.,
264 N.J. Super. 334, 338, 624 A.2d 990, 993 (App.Div. 1993)) (stating that the
appellate division reasoned that "'the shelter scheme which appellants now attack
was thoroughly explored by the [administrative law judge] and the Commissioner
and approved by the Supreme Court in Williams'").
10 Id.at 321, 633 A.2d at 973.
1 See Williams, 116 N.J. at 123, 561 A.2d at 255 ("We realize that government
cannot achieve the impossible and that despite the best efforts, some people will
indeed slip through the net.").
12 See id. at 104,
561 A.2d at 245.
1. See id. at 321, 633 A.2d at 973.
14
See L.T., 134 N.J. at 325, 633 A.2d at 975 ("[Wle believe that the Legislature

intends that the GA program be administered in such a way as to provide temporary
shelter for the most needy of our citizens. A regulation that terminated TRA without
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General Public Assistance Act indeed required DHS to provide GA
recipients with shelter as long as needed."'
The New Jersey Supreme Court has frequently referred to GA as
the program of last resort for needy single persons and couples
without minor children.' 6 Those individuals come to the GA program
out of desperation, usually with no other income or resources. They
rarely have family or friends on whom they can rely for support; their
family and friends may themselves be struggling. In some cases, while
the recipient may be able to work, he or she lacks the education,
skills, or means to secure employment. Also, if health problems
interfere with keeping ajob, the recipient may have become mired in
the lengthy process of obtaining disability benefits from the Social
Security Administration.
The $140 monthly individual GA grant, 7 however, is hardly
enough in most cases to cover even shelter costs. According to a DHS
"standard of need," promulgated pursuant to a New Jersey Supreme
Court mandate,'8 a one-person GA household needs a monthly
income of $582 "to maintain a safe and decent life."'19 GA grants,
however, have remained unchanged since 1987.20 While most GA
recipients also receive food stamps, a one-person household would
still fail to meet the standard of need by more than $300 a month.
Unable to pay their rent because of inadequate income, most
GA recipients face homelessness. As a result, GA recipients come to
rely upon Emergency Assistance (EA), a supplemental GA program
intended to meet a recipient's emergent shelter needs.' Initially,
DHS limited EA to three months of shelter or motel placement and
permitted relief only when there had been no notice of imminent
loss of shelter.
The appellate division, however, invalidated the
"fault standard" and, in Rodgers v. Gibson, ordered DHS reassessment

a fall-back provision for shelter conflicts with that purpose.").
1.' See id.

16 See, e.g., Williams, 116 N.J. at 107, 561 A.2d at 248 (citing Pascucci v. Vagott,
71
NJ. 40, 44, 362 A.2d 566, 569 (1976)).
17 See L.T., 134 N.J. at 308, 633 A.2d at 966. The monthly grant is increased
to
$210 if the recipient is considered "unemployable." See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:85-

4.1 (b) (repealed 1998); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 10:90-3.5, -3.6 (1998).

18 In re Petitions for Rulemaking, N.J.A.C. 10:82-1.2 and 10:85-4.1, 117 N.J. 311,

314, 566 A.2d 1154, 1155 (1989).
19 See NJ. ADMIN. CODE § 10:85-4.1(d) (repealed
1998).
20

19 NJ. REG. 1095(a) (June 15, 1987).

21

See, e.g., L.T., 134 NJ. at 308, 633 A.2d at 966 (noting that petitioners often

relied on EA grants to avoid homelessness).

See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:854.6 (repealed 1998).
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Subsequently, DHS amended its

regulations to require that the recipient lack "a realistic capacity to
plan" for the housing emergency and to permit an additional two
months of EA.2 4 This new five-month limit was challenged in
Williams.25 The Williams Court held that it would confirm the validity
of the Department's five-month limit on EA upon a showing that
other programs were in place to make "reasonably certain that [EA
claimants] previously housed in motels will find shelter and
eventually housing elsewhere." 6 The matter, thus, was remanded to
DHS for the development of an adequate record by the Office of
Administrative Law. 7 The department adopted the administrative
law judge's finding that DHS must promulgate regulations that
establish the manner in which GA recipients can obtain continuing
shelter upon termination of the five months of motel or shelter
placement.
New DHS regulations included temporary rental
assistance, a rental subsidy for up to twelve months in permanent
housing.
In Paterson, the largest congregate shelter was open only during
the winter months and closed by Easter. Consequently, the Paterson
Municipal Welfare Department relied heavily upon the downtown
Paterson YMCA for sheltering its clients, first under Emergency
Assistance, then under temporary rental assistance. Because rent at
the YMCA shelter was $352 a month, the Paterson Municipal Welfare
Department considered the YMCA the least expensive housing
available to its clients.2
Following the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Williams,
the New Jersey Administrative Code provided that "EA is designed to
provide, with reasonable certainty, for the initial and/or continuing
emergency shelter needs of otherwise eligible [General Assistance]
23
24

N.J.

218 N.J. Super. 452, 459, 528 A.2d 43, 47 (App. Div. 1987).
See 19 N.J. REG. 1 7 15(a); N.J. REG. 1716 (proposed Sept. 21, 1987) (amending

10:85-4.6(a) (3) (adoptedJan. 4, 1988)).
SeeWilliams v. NewJersey Dep't of Human Services, 116 N.J. 102, 104, 561 A.2d

ADMIN. CODE §

25

244, 245 (1989).
26
Williams, 116 N.J. at 114, 561 A.2d at 251.

See id. at 119, 561 A.2d at 253; Williams v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Serv.,
121 N.J. 589, 589-90, 583 A.2d 297, 297 (1989) (ordering remand to the DHS and
subsequent referral of the matter to the Office of Administrative Law to resolve
factual disputes).
28 See Williams, 121 N.J. at 667-68, 583 A.2d at 351
(setting forth the administrative
law judge's findings and noting the substantial adoption by the DHS of those
27

findings).
See L.T. v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Serv., 134 N.J. 304, 308, 633 A.2d 964,
966 (1993).
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recipients."" Nevertheless, twelve months after the temporary rental
assistance regulation took effect, GA recipients living at the Paterson
YMCA received notice that their temporary rental assistance was
being terminated and that they had exhausted their right to further
GA shelter support."' Thus, the post-Williams DHS regulations had
failed to address the availability of shelter assistance after the
expiration of temporary rental assistance, despite the fact that the
Human Services Commissioner had adopted the finding of the
administrative law judge that this "nagging question" needed to be
resolved.
Many General Assistance recipients requested hearings under
section 10:85-4.6(d)4i of the Code, which provided that a GA
recipient facing temporary rental assistance termination had the right
to request a fair hearing and receive continued temporary rental
assistance pending a final hearing decision." In most cases, the
administrative law judge recommended an individualized extension
of temporary rental assistance in light of the Commissioner's safety
net assurances in Williams. 4 In some instances, the administrative law
judge suggested that the Municipal Welfare Department and aid
recipient reexamine the "plan of action aimed at working toward
resolving the circumstances that contributed to his or her emergency
situation."5
Recipients in Paterson, however, rarely received such
personalized help. For example, L.T., who was in his late fifties and
had trouble walking,- had been denied disability benefits " Because
of extensive work experience as a truck driver, L.T. potentially
qualified for Social Security benefits far in excess of those available
under the Supplemental Security Income program. Our office
assisted L.T. in reapplying for his Social Security. His Social Security
disability case required minimal development and his long work

31
32

N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:85-4.6(e) (repealed 1998).
See L.T., 134 N.J. at 306, 633 A.2d at 966.
See Williams v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Serv., OAL No. HPW 38-90, at 6

(March 1, 1990).

N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:85-4.6(d)4i (repealed 1998).
. See, e.g., L.T. v. Paterson MWA, OAL No. HPW3904-92 (May 29, 1992); L.M. v.
Paterson MWA, OAL No. HPW 3659-92 (May 22, 1992); L.McK v. Paterson MWA,
OAL No. HPW 6120-92 (Aug. 19, 1992); J.W. v. Paterson MWA, OAL No. 3658-92
(MaJ 22, 1992);J.W. v. Paterson MW, OAL No. HPW 6722-92 (Sept. 4, 1992).
See, e.g., M.M. v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Serv., OAL No. HPW 6722-92
(Seat. 4, 1992).
See L.T. v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Serv., 134 N.J. 304, 308, 633 A.2d 964,
966 (1993).
3 See id.
3
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history and longstanding disability meant substantial retroactive
benefits. This was a simple fee-generating case that any lawyer with a
Social Security practice would have handled. I asked a supervisor at
the Paterson Municipal Welfare Department why no one had
encouraged L.T. to pursue his Social Security claim as part of his
service plan. The supervisor responded that "he can work" and "you
have to be on death's doorstep before you get [Social Security
Income]."
After the residents of the Paterson YMCA were denied additional
temporary rental assistance, notices of appeal were filed with the
appellate division. Subsequently, when the Paterson YMCA initiated
eviction proceedings, four petitioners sought emergent relief from
the appellate division. In two instances, divided panels ordered
continued temporary rental assistance, indicating concern over the
failure to develop an adequate service plan.
L.T. was granted a
stay. In two other cases, the panels denied stays, as did the New
Jersey Supreme Court. 4 The Court, however, ordered expedited
hearings in these two cases.4 ' The appellate division consolidated our
first five appeals as L. T.42
The appellate division panel that eventually heard L. T. included
one judge who had dissented in the granting of stays and another
who had participated in panels that unanimously denied stays.
During oral argument, the panel indicated unease at ordering
perpetual temporary rental assistance. Our response was that L.T.
would not have needed continuing temporary rental assistance had
the Municipal Welfare Department assisted him with his Social
Security disability claim as part of the service plan required under
section 10:85-4.6(c) (5) of the Code.43
Within days of the appellate division oral argument, L.T.
received a letter from Social Security approving his claim. I informed
the panel members that L.T. now would have sufficient monthly
income to pay his own rent. In a footnote to its opinion, the panel
U See L.T v. NewJersey Dep't of Human Serv., No. A-5166-91T3 (June
12, 1992);
L.W. v. Dep't of Human Serv., No. A-5244-91t3 (June 12, 1992).
s9 See L.T. v. NewJersey Dep't of Human Serv., 264 N.J. Super. 334, 343 n.1, 624
A.2d 990, 995 n.1 (App. Div. 1993).
40
See, L.T. v. Dep't of Human Serv., 264 N.J. Super. 334, 343 n.1, 624 A.2d
990,
995 n.1 (App. Div. 1993).
41 McK v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Serv., No 35, 975 (Oct. 20, 1992); J.W.
v.
Dep't of Human Serv., No. 35,874 (Oct. 20, 1992).
42 Order of Consolidation, No. A-5166-91T3, A-5244-91T3,
A-0098-92T3, A-058492T3 (Nov. 13, 1992).
43 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:85-4.6(c) (5) (repealed
1998).
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acknowledged L.T.'s receipt of Social Security,"" but missed its
significance:
Finally, we agree with appellants' basic premise that there is
nothing in the record to indicate that shelter is available to them

in light of their severely limited incomes of $140 per month, plus
food stamps. Consequently, we conclude that the record does not

demonstrate a nexus between the alleged violation of N.J.A.C.
10:85-4.6(c) (5) and the appellants' status as homeless persons.45"
In the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion, however, Justice O'Hern
saw the nexus.
Justice O'Hern's opinion clearly established that homeless
General Assistance recipients had a right under the General Public
Assistance Act to continued shelter as long as a need existed. 4
Significantly, the Justice ordered that this continued aid take the
form of temporary rental assistance.47 Therefore, GA recipients would
not be returned to the streets solely because they had received twelve
months of temporary rental assistance. The Municipal Welfare
Department was obligated under DHS regulations to develop, with
the GA recipient, an effective plan to secure and maintain housing
independent of Emergency Assistance.
Moreover, the recipient
could not be penalized by the Municipal Welfare Department's
failure to develop such a sufficient plan.
Justice O'Hern's opinion refused to denigrate, stereotype, or
depersonalize the petitioners. Each petitioner had a name. The
Justice recognized that "[f] or the most part, they were working men
who were experiencing difficult times." 4 Each had his own set of
problems and misfortunes resulting in his becoming homeless. The
fact that each petitioner had become homeless only exacerbated
those problems.
In contrast, the Paterson Municipal Welfare
Department had handled all six cases exactly the same way. Everyone
was simply required to search for permanent housing less expensive
than the Paterson YMCA. Unfortunately, there was no such housing
and the effort was futile. This "strategy" was destined to fail.
Justice O'Hern recognized that what had become a cynical,
demoralizing exercise for the petitioners should have real meaning:
44 See L.T., 264 N.J. Super. at 344 n.2, 624 A.2d at 996 n.2
("On the eve of the
filing of this opinion counsel informed us that L.T.'s claim for disability benefits has
been approved by the Social Security Administration and as a result 'he now has
monthly income sufficient to cover his rent at the... YMCA.'").
45 Id. at 344, 624 A.2d
at 996.
46 SeeL. T, 134 N.J. at 325,
633 A.2d at 975.
47 See id. at 307, 633 A.2d
at 966.
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That requirement of an "individualized plan of action"
The regulations
contemplates more than mere formalism.
contemplate a wise counselor examining the individual needs of
the EA recipient, mapping out a plan to resolve the circumstances
that produced the individual's homelessness, and steering the
client through the bureaucratic thickets of other programs.
The justice asserted persuasively that DHS emphasis on developing
appropriate service plans could more effectively conserve resources
than any arbitrary time limit on assistanceY' Yet, Justice O'Hern also
recognized that there were currently few administrative incentives for
The time limit on
the Municipal Welfare Department to do this.'
temporary rental assistance had itself been a disincentive; every case,
with or without a service plan, could be closed after twelve months of
the assistance.
The twelve-month milestone would still remain
significant, but now as a gauge on the effectiveness of the service
plan.
Moreover, the fact that the Court ordered continued temporary
rental assistance, as opposed to some other form of aid, was
particularly welcome. Shelter life offered little privacy or decency,
often little more than a cot to sleep on during the night. Most
shelters were only open at night. Apartment placement, on the other
hand, brought some stability back to the lives of the homeless and
gave them permanent addresses. Unlike motel or shelter placement,
it did not stigmatize the person as being homeless and was far less
costly.
As an immediate result of Justice O'Hern's opinion, two
petitioners, M.M., who had spent that summer homeless in a
Each
downtown park, and L.W. were returned to the YMCA.
eventually qualified for federal Section 8 housing subsidies, obviating
any further need for temporary rental assistance. J.S., another
petitioner who had sought emergent relief from the Court shortly
after oral argument in L. T., was able to pay his rent after his landlady
was persuaded to await the Court's decision. He eventually found
employment and left the General Assistance rolls. L.T. had never
been evicted from the YMCA because the lifting of the appellate
division stay had coincided with his receipt of Social Security
disability benefits.

44 Id. at 317, 633 A.2d at 971.
50 See id. at 322, 633 A.2d at 974.
5

See id.at 318, 633 A.2d at 972.

52 See L.T. v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Serv., 264 N.J. Super. 334, 344 & n.2,

624 A.2d 990,996 & n.2 (App. Div. 1993).
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These men, however, were not the only beneficiaries of Justice
O'Hern's decision. The decision resulted in the settlement of a dozen
or so remaining appeals in our office alone. In Paterson, the
onslaught of temporary rental assistance terminations stopped, while
the Municipal Welfare Department continued to place clients at the
Paterson YMCA under temporary rental assistance. The Star-Ledger
estimated that the case would affect hundreds statewide. Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)53 recipients began to
argue that under L.T. their families also remained eligible for
continued temporary rental assistance.
The Department of Human Services was not pleased with the
decision; the Commissioner's official response was that "the decision
turns a program designed as a temporary bridge into a 'permanent
benefit."' The Commissioner further commented that his agency
"'cannot solve the state's low-income housing problem' on its own,
but the Court's ruling 'move[s] the Department one step closer to
the role of primary funder of housing services, a role beyond its
primary mission, expertise and budget.' '
The Director of the
Division of Family Development was quoted as stating, "We are not
the housing agency. More and more we are becoming the housing
agency in the state. I don't think that responsibility ought to exist in
human services. "55 Within months, legislation limiting temporary
rental assistance to twelve months for• AFDC families
as well as for
56
General Assistance recipients was introduced.
Welfare recipients
packed meetings of the committees considering the legislation.
Recipients testified to being placed in transitional housing or
undergoing job training only to have the gains threatened by the
arbitrary time limit on temporary rental assistance. Ultimately, the
legislation died. The DHS continually resisted an extension of the
L.T. ruling to AFDC recipients until the appellate division ordered
such an expanded application of the rule in 1996. "
Later in 1996, the United States Congress repealed the AFDC
program,m replacing it with the block-grant time-limited Temporary

.1 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (repealed 1996).

Jeffrey Kanige, Limit Stricken on HousingAssitancefor Homeless, N.J. L.J.,
Dec. 20,
1993, at 13.
.5 Donna Leusner, Senate Panel Endorses One-Year Limit on HousingAid After Sharp
Debate, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),June 3, 1994, at A12.
56

Id.

57

See B.N. v. Dep't of Human Serv., 287 N.J. Super. 270, 670 A.2d 111 (App. Div.

1996).

42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (repealed 1996).
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Assistance to Needy Families program.5 Legislation creating Work
First New Jersey, which consolidated the state GA and AFDC
programs, was enacted the following year.6
Work First New Jersey contained a twelve-month limit on
Emergency Assistance.'
Exceptions to the twelve-month limit
included their own time limits. 62 Justice O'Hern had indicated in his
L.T. opinion that there might come a time "when our society can no
longer afford to shelter the homeless." 63 It is troubling that that time
appears to have arrived during a period of prosperity.
Justice O'Hern's opinion in L.T posited an even-handed,
coherent, and compassionate response to the problem of
homelessness. It demanded the best efforts of all the parties. It
ensured assistance for those truly in need. Whether New Jersey's
most needy and vulnerable will continue to be protected without L.T.
remains to be seen.

59

42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (1997).

60 NJ. ADMIN. CODE §§ 10:90-6.1 to -6.10
(supp. 1999).
61
62

See N.J. STAT. §§ 44:10-51(a) (1997); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 10:90-6.4(a) (1998).
See N.J. STAT. §§ 44:10-51, 53 (1997); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 10:90-6.4, 6.9, -6.10

(1998).
6
L.T. v. Dep't of Human Serv., 134 N.J. 304, 325, 633 A.2d 964, 975
(1993).

